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Abstract
Much nonmanagerial work is routine, with all workers having sim-
ilar output most of the time. However, failure to address occasional
challenges can be very costly, and consequently easily detected, while
challenges handled well pass unnoticed. We analyze job-assignment
and worker-monitoring for such ‘guardian’ jobs. If monitoring costs
are positive but small, monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm’s be-
lief about the probability that a worker is good. The model explains
several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor
markets: low use of performance pay, seniority pay, rare demotions,
wage ceilings within grade and wage jumps at promotion.
∗The research in this paper was supported in part by NSF grant SES-1260917. We
are grateful to Costas Cavounidis, Bob Gibbons, Sambuddha Ghosh, Eddie Lazear, Bart
Lipman, Andy Newman, Mike Waldman and participants at seminars, workshops and
conferences at Boston University, MIT, the NBER, SOLE, Tel Aviv University, UC Santa
Barbara and the University of New South Wales for helpful comments and suggestions.
The usual caveat applies.
We present a formal model of monitoring for worker quality in “guardian”
jobs (Baron and Kreps 1999). Many nonmanagerial jobs have the principal
characteristics of such jobs. We analyze efficient monitoring in guardian jobs
and show that it results in wage and promotion profiles consistent with a
number of regularities observed in non-managerial labor markets. Notably,
we predict that pay will be largely based on factors—such as age, experience
and seniority—that may be related to productivity, but are not themselves
measures of productivity (Doeringer and Piore 1971).
We make three significant departures from the current literature. First,
we assume the primary purpose of monitoring is to evaluate worker quality
at this job and not to prevent workers from shirking on the job. To focus
attention on the evaluative role of monitoring, we abstract entirely from
moral hazard.
Second, we treat guardian jobs as common in nonmanagerial employment:
much of the work is routine, and there is typically little variation (in our
formal model, none) in worker productivity; there are occasional ‘challenges’
which good workers tend to face successfully, while bad workers tend to fail
at significant cost to the firm. Such challenges are firms’ sole opportunity to
distinguish worker quality.
Third, we formalize the view that failures are much more noticeable than
successes and are observed even if the firm does not actively monitor the
worker. However, when a worker successfully handles a challenge, output
is not disrupted, making the firm less likely to observe a success unless it
actively monitors the worker.1
Jacobs (1981) describes the classic guardian job: “Even if the professional
pilot never makes any mistakes in a long career, his company’s profits will not
go up, but one error may be quite costly to his airline.” The famous con-artist,
Frank Abagnale, claims to have worked for eleven months as chief resident
pediatrician in a Georgia hospital until he was faced with an oxygen-deprived
baby and was almost exposed (Abagnale 1980). Despite having no medical
training or tertiary education, he handled routine tasks until he encountered
an unusual challenge.
But there are many other examples. The racist employee who responds
inappropriately to an African-American customer may cost the firm far more
1This technology is, in many ways, similar to the Biais et al (2012) model of moral
hazard in which very costly challenges arrive infrequently. There effort rather than ability
reduces the probability of failing a challenge.
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in legal expenses and bad publicity than a somewhat faster worker could earn
in additional profit. The worker who fails to notice or report a potential safety
or mechanical problem may cause substantial losses. Nonmanagerial workers
often have little opportunity to vastly increase profit but can impose large
costs.
Because they are costly, such failures are often readily observable. As
Jacobs also observes “Little can be known about the comparative success of
a specific police department, prison, or welfare agency. Mistakes, however,
are often quite visible....” Consequently, failures are often punished severely
(Baron and Kreps 1999). Successes are much less obvious. Had a worker
responded appropriately to the gas bubble rising through the Deepwater oil
well, his actions would likely have passed largely unnoticed.
Not all jobs display this asymmetry. In ‘star’ jobs (Baron and Kreps
1999), successes are rare and easier to observe than squandered opportunities.
In ‘foot soldier’ jobs neither success nor failure has a large impact on profits.2
In our model, a firm can learn about a worker either by passively updat-
ing its assessment of the worker’s likelihood of being good, or by actively
monitoring her. If it does not monitor her, it does not know when a chal-
lenge arrives. However, when a worker fails a challenge, the firm learns this
immediately. The longer the worker is not observed to fail, the more likely
it is that the worker addressed one or more challenges successfully. Thus
even without monitoring, the firm updates its assessment of the probability
that the worker is good. If the firm monitors the worker, this does not yield
additional information on failures, but it allows the firm to observe when a
challenge arises. When it does, and the worker handles it, the firm learns
immediately that the worker is good, and can move her instantly to a job
where her skill is more valuable and the cost of failures higher.
The model has important implications for the sequencing of monitoring,
an area that has received little attention in the economics literature. Since
monitoring is costly and firms acquire information just by waiting, workers
who are initially very unlikely to be good are monitored only after a period
with the firm during which they do not fail a challenge. Similarly, workers
2We conjecture, but have not proved, that ‘star’ settings are conducive to up or out
contracts. A related paper (Cavounidis and Lang, 2015) examines a setting where both
successes and failures are observed only when workers are monitored. This provides in-
teresting implications for labor market equilibrium, but little or no insight into internal
labor markets. Prendergast (2007) explores the consequence of symmetry and asymmetry
in the probability of detecting bureaucratic errors.
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thought to be nearly good enough to be assigned to a more challenging
task are not monitored because with high probability they will be promoted
shortly; the additional information from monitoring does not justify the cost.
Monitoring is efficient only if the cost is not too high and the firm’s assessment
of the worker is neither too high nor too low.
In the model, there are two potential paths to promotion although both
need not be present in a single firm. Workers with sufficiently high expected
productivity at hire are never monitored. But workers about whom initial
expectations are sufficiently low are monitored during a period that, in equi-
librium, just precedes promotion or separation. Under some interpretations
of the model, this can be viewed as a training period or a period of supervised
work in the more challenging task, which leads to promotion upon successful
completion. Thus workers who are monitored are those who are some dis-
tance from being promoted in the absence of monitoring. The model does
not imply that monitored workers are unlikely to be promoted soon.
For most of the formal modeling, we ignore wage determination and fo-
cus on efficient monitoring and job assignment. However, later we develop
a Nash bargaining model of wage determination. Using this model of wage
determination, we show that our monitoring model fits a number of regular-
ities regarding nonmanagerial compensation. In particular, a) pay for many
nonmanagerial workers does not depend on either subjective or objective
performance measures; b) individual wages are largely determined by objec-
tive factors such as seniority, experience, occupational grade, education and
other formal qualifications which may be correlates of productivity but are
not themselves measures of productivity; c) many salary scales have a fixed
number of steps so that workers at the top of the scale receive no further
individual pay increase unless promoted; d) wages jump at promotion, and
e) demotions are rare.
Perhaps surprisingly, the modest literature on learning in the labor mar-
ket generally treats learning as passive and thus ignores the significant re-
sources spent on monitoring. In Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and
Pierret (2001), Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006) and Lange (2007) firms
learn about general market skills, all information is public, and new infor-
mation arises continuously. In Waldman (1984), Greenwald (1986), Gibbons
and Katz (1991), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Autor (2001), Schoenberg
(2007) and Li (2013) skills are general but only the current employer learns
the worker’s skills. There are some exceptions. Meyer (1994) models learn-
ing about individual abilities within teams. Lazear (1986) discusses when
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to measure (akin to monitoring) worker output. In Prendergast (2003) the
principal pays to increase the probability of detecting a bureaucratic error.
In this paper we abstract from moral hazard altogether. Practitioners are
often surprised that the personnel economics literature almost universally as-
sumes that the sole purpose of monitoring is creating incentives for effort.
While this is a valid reason for monitoring, modeling it solely in terms of in-
centives generates problematic empirical predictions and theoretical results.
Theoretically, since detection is costly and deterrence depends on the prob-
ability of detection multiplied by the cost of punishment, shirking should be
punished as harshly as possible and monitoring should be minimal. Dick-
ens, Katz, Lang and Summers (1989) refer to this as the monitoring puzzle.
Akerlof and Katz (1986) show that if backloading pay or requiring a bond
is costly, the only solution is the one in Becker and Stigler (1974): workers
“buy” their jobs and have the purchase price returned at retirement. If work-
ers’ ability to purchase their job is limited, firms may require them to engage
in rent-dissipating behavior (Murphy and Topel 1990). Neither purchase of
jobs nor obviously rent-dissipating requirements are common features of job
contracts. Costly bonding is consistent with more general earnings profiles,
but wages must be less than the value of marginal product (VMP) early in
seniority and more than VMP later (Lazear 1979, 1981). This implies that
junior workers desire less work than required by the optimal contract while
senior workers want more work, a result inconsistent with the data on desired
work hours (Kahn and Lang 1992, 1995).
Section 1 presents the model and establishes the efficient monitoring and
task-assignment strategy. Wage-determination is addressed in Section 2, and
Section 3 presents alternative interpretations and an extension to partial
monitoring. The empirical relevance of our predictions is discussed in Section
4. The final section concludes.
1 The Formal Model
An employer hires a worker whom he can put in a high task (H) or a low
task (L). The worker’s productivity in a task depends on her type, good (G)
or bad (B).3 Both types produce a flow output q per unit time in L and
g + q, g > 0 in H. θ denotes the firm’s belief that the worker is good. For
the moment it is irrelevant whether type is general or firm-specific. Later we
3We abstract from changes in worker quality over time. See Kahn and Lange (2014).
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will treat the value of θ when the worker starts at the firm, denoted by θ˜, as
the probability the worker is good at a randomly chosen firm. Thus a worker
with θ˜ equal to 0.7 is good at 70 percent of the firms at which she may work
and bad at the rest.4
Challenges arrive at Poisson rate λ in both tasks. This ensures that task
assignment is unaffected by its impact on learning about productivity. This
type of assumption is common in the literature on internal labor markets (e.g.
Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Assuming that challenges are more common in
H makes the algebra more cumbersome and provides little additional insight
(see Section 1.3).
Bad workers fail when a challenge arises.5 Failure generates negative
output −cl in the L-task and −ch in the H-task, with ch > cl. If a worker
is bad and a challenge arises, the failure is immediately observed, and the
worker’s type is revealed. Good workers resolve challenges, with no impact
on productivity. Thus if the worker is good, the occurrence of a challenge
can be known only if the worker is actively monitored, in which case her type
is revealed.6 We assume g + q − λch < q − λcl so that the expected flow of
output net of costs due to failed challenges is lower when a bad worker is
placed in the H-task than when she is placed in the L-task. Under complete
information, clearly good workers will be put in the H-task.
Time is continuous. The discount rate is r. Workers and firms live forever.
We begin by deriving the efficient task assignment and monitoring rules.
We then turn to market equilibrium. Our wage determination mechanism
combined with symmetric information ensures that task assignment and mon-
itoring are efficient in equilibrium.
4An alternative interpretation of θ is that it measures the match between worker at-
tributes and the industry or occupation. If θ is revealed to be low, the worker quits the
industry (and firm). In this case no rent accrues to the firm-worker match, the wage must
reflect the worker’s full productivity, and the firm must earn zero profit. This does not
affect the analysis of efficient monitoring, but significantly simplifies the wage model later
in the paper.
5Garicano (2000) develops a model where workers who cannot handle a task can pass
it to a higher level of the hierarchy.
6It is perhaps more realistic to treat challenges as settings with an increased risk of a
bad outcome (e.g. safety equipment not set up properly, inflammable materials too close
to a machine that may produce sparks). This would somewhat complicate the model but
not the essential conclusions.
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1.1 Turnover
Our model of turnover is simple. We interpret θ˜, the value of θ when the
worker first arrives at the firm, as the ex ante probability the worker will be
good at a randomly selected job (possibly from within a class of jobs). Any
information about the ability of the worker to resolve challenges is match-
specific. Therefore if the updated assessment falls below θ˜, it is efficient for
the worker and firm to separate, and they do so. Otherwise it is efficient for
the worker and firm to continue their relationship, and they do so. Thus in
the base model, the worker remains with the firm unless she fails to resolve
a challenge in which case she quits or is fired. Note success or failure at one
firm could provide information about productivity elsewhere provided it is
more informative about productivity at the former.7
Note that since turnover occurs if and only if the worker is observed to fail
and since monitoring does not affect whether failure is observed, there will
be no need in what follows to consider the impact of monitoring on turnover.
1.2 Monitoring
The employer can either monitor or not-monitor. If she does not monitor,
she only learns the worker’s type if the worker is bad, a challenge arises and
therefore the worker fails. If the worker is good or no challenge arrives, the
employer observes nothing but can update her beliefs about the worker as
time passes. If she monitors the worker, then she continues to do so until a
challenge arises, and she therefore learns the worker’s type. The flow cost
of monitoring is b per unit time and must be borne until a challenge arises.
Note that under monitoring the employer’s belief is fixed until a challenge
arises and the employer learns the worker’s type. Therefore, if it was efficient
to monitor the worker, it remains efficient until the firm observes a challenge.
In the formal model, we treat monitoring as simply observing the worker.
This interpretation implies that the firm only monitors workers in the L-task
since it gets no benefit from monitoring in the H-task. If the worker is good,
she is already assigned to the right task. If she is bad, the firm will bear the
cost of a single failure with or without monitoring.
Alternatively monitoring may help catch and mitigate failures to handle
7We abstract from unemployment, which might discourage workers with a low proba-
bility of being good at any firm from pursuing a new match even if they know they are
poorly matched with their current firm.
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challenges. This may be particularly valuable in the H-task where the cost
of failures is high. If cl is sufficiently low, the firm will not expend resources
monitoring workers in the L-task. But it will monitor the workers that have
the lowest probability of being good among those assigned to the H-task.
Both cases arise in the real world. We are aware of at least one call center
that monitors incoming-call workers more closely before shifting them to
making outgoing calls. In other settings, workers nearing promotion perform
the new task(s) under supervision and are only promoted after showing that
they are competent. If we interpret promotion as being assigned to the H-
task without monitoring, the two models are essentially the same, and it is
possible to choose parameters under which they are isomorphic.8 In a web
appendix we derive our principal results for the case where monitoring also
serves to mitigate mistakes in the H-task.
1.3 Efficient promotion without monitoring
First consider a worker who is never monitored. If, at a given time, the
worker’s probability of being good, θ0, is not too high, the employer will
place her in the L-task. If the worker fails, she is immediately revealed to
be bad and leaves the firm. If she has not failed by time t, the employer
updates his belief about the worker’s type to θ(t, θ0). When θ(t, θ0) becomes
sufficiently high, the employer may promote her to the H-task. Similarly,
if the firm’s prior at time 0 is sufficiently high, the worker will be placed
immediately in the H-task.
Lemma 1.1. If the firm does not monitor the worker, it is efficient to promote
her to the H-task when its assessment of the probability that she is good
reaches
θ∗ =
λ (ch − cl)− g
λ (ch − cl) (1)
provided that the initial prior satisfied
θ0 < θ
∗.
If θ0 ≥ θ∗, the firm places the worker in the H task immediately.
(All proofs are in the appendix.)
8Let the mitigating effect of monitoring be ch − cl and the cost of monitoring in the
H−task be b∗ = b+ g.
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Note that (1) has a natural interpretation. The worker is promoted when
the expected flow payoffs in the L and H tasks are equal, that is
q − (1− θ∗)λcl = g + q − (1− θ∗)λch. (2)
This follows from the assumption that learning about productivity is indepen-
dent of task assignment so that assignment is determined solely by expected
output. It is plausible that challenges would arrive more frequently in the
H-task. If so, workers would be promoted later than implied by equation
(1). However, we have not obtained any additional insights from allowing for
different arrival rates of challenges and therefore have not pursued this path.
1.4 Payoff with the monitoring strategy
When the employer monitors the worker, he knows when the first challenge
arises, and immediately identifies the worker’s type. It is efficient to imme-
diately promote good workers and for bad workers to separate from the firm.
Before the first challenge arrives, there is no new information and therefore
no continuous updating of beliefs.
Let θ0 be the prior that the worker is good when the employer starts mon-
itoring her. When the first challenge arrives, with probability θ0 the worker
resolves the challenge and is promoted to the H-task, with the complemen-
tary probability, she fails and leaves the firm. In either case the employer
stops monitoring. Recall that monitoring has a flow cost of b per unit time.
We prove in the appendix that
Lemma 1.2. The value of the monitoring strategy with efficient promotion is
U˜(θ0) =
λθ0g − rb
r(λ+ r)
− (1− θ0) λcl
λ+ r
+
(λθ0 + r) q
r(λ+ r)
. (3)
In what follows, we assume that
g
r
− b
λ
> 0. (4)
If not, even if a firm knew a worker was good and could assign the worker to
the H-task only by monitoring and observing her solve a challenge, it would
prefer not to do so.
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1.5 Efficient monitoring
Given θ the firm can decide to monitor immediately, not monitor until θ
reaches a higher value through updating, or never monitor.9 We find there
are always ranges of θ in which the firm does not monitor, and if monitoring
costs are not too high, there is a range in which it monitors immediately.
Theorem 1.1. There is always a range [0, θa) and a range (θb, θ
∗] in which it
is efficient not to monitor the worker.
Theorem 1.1 establishes that workers who are very unlikely to be good will
not be monitored; nor will workers who are close to promotion. However, it
does not ensure that firms will ever monitor workers. The following theorem
addresses this point.
Theorem 1.2.
If
(
g (λ+ r)
gλ− br
)λ+r
r
<
λ (ch − cl)− g
b
, (5)
there is an interval [θa, θb] 6= ∅, with θa = b(λ+r)λ(g+b) , such that it is efficient to
monitor a worker if and only if θ ∈ [θa, θb].
Remark 1.1. The proof of theorem 1.2 shows that for any worker who joins
the firm with θ˜ < θa it is efficient to begin monitoring the worker only when
θ reaches θa, provided that condition (5) holds.
Remark 1.2. Note that, except in a knife-edge case, it is not efficient to begin
monitoring at the θ where the value of monitoring first exceeds the value of
never monitoring.
Condition (5) is not particularly informative. We can derive somewhat
more informative conditions. Recall that, by assumption, both sides of the
inequality are positive. As rb→ gλ, the left-hand side goes to infinity while
the right-hand side remains finite. Thus when monitoring costs are high,
not surprisingly it is never efficient to monitor. On the other hand, when
9Formally the firm’s strategy should specify, as a function of the history at each instant
of time (or other appropriate specification), whether the worker should be monitored at
that instant. However, the firm’s assessment of the worker is the only time-dependent
variable in the model, and this becomes static once the firm starts monitoring and until a
challenge arrives. Thus it cannot be optimal for the firm to switch to no-monitoring once
it has optimally started monitoring, and it is sufficient to consider at most a single switch
from no-monitoring to monitoring.
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monitoring costs are sufficiently low, there is a range in which monitoring is
efficient.
The firm gains from monitoring by ensuring it never places a bad worker in
the H-task. The flow cost of doing so is λ (ch − cl). Again not surprisingly, as
this term gets large, there is always a range in which monitoring is efficient.
When it gets small, or equivalently when the benefit from placing a good
worker in the H-task gets small, monitoring is never efficient.
Increasing the frequency of challenges, λ, lowers the left-hand-side and
increases the right-hand side of (5). Thus more frequent arrival of challenges
is associated with a larger range of other parameters consistent with mon-
itoring. A higher rate of time discounting is similar to a lower value of λ
and thus leads to a more restricted set of parameters consistent with some
monitoring.
2 Wage Profiles
Next we model wage determination. Intuitively, we expect the wage to in-
crease as the expected flow of output increases or, possibly, as θ increases,
which is not quite the same. This section derives a bargaining model with
the former property.
We restrict attention to settings with symmetric information. This is a
reasonable assumption for many interpretations of the model, though there
are of course many other interpretations for which it is not reasonable. Sym-
metric information is the most natural assumption when monitoring consists
of some variant of external testing (see section 3.1 below). Rather than wait-
ing for a challenge to arise, the monitor may be able to simulate challenges
and assess whether the worker solves them.
We assume that when the firm and worker meet, they Nash bargain over a
fully contingent contract, specifying monitoring, task assignment and wages
conditional on history. The number of agreements consistent with Nash
bargaining is large. To ensure uniqueness, we impose a form of renegotiation-
proofness. We require that if negotiation were exogenously reopened, the
continuation of the original agreement would be the outcome of the Nash
bargaining over future wages, task assignment and monitoring.
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2.1 The Nash Bargaining Solution
Since Nash bargaining is efficient by assumption, monitoring and task as-
signment will be as derived in the previous section.10 We focus on wage
determination.
Define Wt (θt) as the expected (future) discounted value of wage payments
and Vt (θt) as the expected discounted value of output net of monitoring at
this firm going forward from time t when θ is believed to be θt. Note that
these expectations account for the possibility of failure. Define Ua as the value
to the worker of moving to another firm. This includes the possibility that she
will fail at the next job and thus move again. Denote the flow value of W and
V by wt and vt. We treat Ua as constant, implying that success or failure at
this firm provides no additional information about the probability of success
elsewhere. Letting performance at this firm be somewhat informative about
the probability of success elsewhere changes only details, not the fundamental
results.
Theorem 2.1. Let β be the worker’s Nash bargaining weight. Then the unique
renegotiation-proof solution to the Nash bargaining problem is
wt = βvt + (1− β) rUa. (6)
Thus, in each period, the worker gets a share of the flow of output net of
any monitoring and expected costs of mistakes, and receives part of the flow
value of her outside option. Note that vt declines from q − (1− θa)λcl to
q−(1− θa)λcl−b at the instant monitoring begins. We return to a discussion
of this inaccurate prediction later.
We have not considered wage determination under asymmetric informa-
tion. Our results will carry over to some settings with asymmetric informa-
tion, especially when the firm is the party that learns of the worker’s ability,
and the firm also has sufficiently high bargaining weight. But there are many
more cases in which asymmetric information would alter our results. A full
investigation of the plethora of possibilities opened up by various formula-
tions of bargaining under asymmetric information would take us too far afield
of the main question.
10The outcome we describe is a fully contingent contract. We use renegotiation-proofness
to select a single efficient contract from the set of efficient fully-contingent contracts. But
our approach rules out the kind of dynamic issues that can lead to hold-up problems.
11
3 Extensions
In this section we first discuss an alternative interpretation of monitoring.
We then extend our base model to allow for partial monitoring, where the
probability of observing a success when it happens is increasing in monitoring
expenditure. Finally, we discuss how our results change if there can be false
positives so that observing success is not conclusive proof that the worker is
good.
3.1 Alternative Interpretation: Formal Testing
We have assumed that the arrival of challenges allowing the firm to observe
successes when monitoring is stochastic. What happens if, when learning is
important, the firm can simulate challenges? This may be difficult in some
settings but simple in others. Here we consider the case where firms can
administer a costly test to determine whether or not the worker is good,
for example by sending the worker to a “training” program where she faces
manufactured challenges. While not isomorphic to our main model, it is
similar.
If the firm is fairly sure the worker is not good, it will not send her to the
program because the cost outweighs the expected benefit. Similarly, for any
fixed positive testing cost, there will be a θ<θ∗, sufficiently close to θ∗, such
that it will not be worth paying for the testing program. But, if it is not too
expensive, for intermediate values of θ, it will be worthwhile.
Suppose that the test costs B. At θ0 the expected value of output after
administering the test is
UT =
θ0(g + q)
r
−B. (7)
Compare this with the value of monitoring in the main model. It will be
clear that the firm will administer the test at θa if
θa(g + q)
r
−B ≥ λθag − rb
r(λ+ r)
− (1− θa) λcl
λ+ r
+
θaq
r
+
(1− θa) q
λ+ r
(8)
or
B ≤ b− (1− θa) (q − λcl) + θag
λ+ r
≡ Ba. (9)
12
The first two terms in the numerator are the flow cost of monitoring net of
the expected output from bad workers. The last term is the added value of
output from good workers since the test is immediate. All of this is adjusted
for discounting and the expected time at which a challenge arrives in the
base model.
IfB = Ba, then the value of testing at θb, the upper limit of the monitoring
zone, is
UT (θb)− U˜(θb) = (θb − θa) (g + q − λcl)
which is zero only in the special case g + q − λcl = 0. If it is positive, it
may be profitable to test the worker even when the firm’s assessment of her
ability is too high for monitoring to be worthwhile, and the converse is true
if it is negative. Thus the two models are not isomorphic, but are similar in
their interpretation and predictions.11
3.2 Partial Monitoring
The results in the preceding sections do not depend critically on assuming
monitoring is a 0− 1 variable. In this section we maintain the model’s other
assumptions but assume the firm can vary its monitoring effort. The firm can
choose effort and the corresponding flow cost b of monitoring. If the worker
resolves a challenge, the firm observes the success with probability p = p(b).
We write the inverse function b = b(p) and assume that b′ ≥ 0 and b′′ ≥ 0.
The following theorem, derived as Theorem A.1 in the appendix, parallels
theorem (1.1):
Theorem 3.1. If b′(0) > 0 and b′′ (p) > 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1], there is always a range
[0, θa) and a range (θb, θ
∗] in which it is efficient not to monitor the worker.
Further, if b′ (0) is sufficiently small, then there is a non-empty interval [θa, θb]
in which a positive amount of monitoring is efficient.
Remark 3.1. If b′(1) is sufficiently small, there will also be a range with com-
plete monitoring. Depending on the shape of the b(p) function, the solution
can be bang-bang as in our base model.
The most interesting case is when monitoring starts at θa and increases
smoothly between θa and some θA at which p equals 1 (full monitoring).
11If both testing and monitoring are available options, then for given b and B we can
calculate U∗, U˜ and UT , and determine ranges in which it is respectively optimal to
update, test and monitor. However, the intuition is sufficiently clear that the full exercise
seems unwarranted.
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It remains at 1 for [θA, θB], then decreases smoothly between θB and θb.
Then if workers are hired with θ˜ < θa, as in the baseline case, they will not
be monitored, but, unless the worker fails to resolve a challenge, the firm’s
assessment of θ will rise continuously until it reaches θa. Thereafter the firm
partially monitors the worker and continues to update θ. If no challenge is
observed, θ rises towards θA.
12 But the firm may see the worker resolve a
challenge and promote her immediately. Thus partial monitoring when θ˜ <
θA allows for the realistic possibility that a worker may be promoted before
he reaches the top of the wage scale. In the region between θa and θA, the
probability of promotion is strictly increasing in θ since both the probability
of being good and the probability of being seen to solve a challenge rise with
θ.
If the worker is hired with θA < θ˜ < θB, the firm does not update θ except
simultaneously with a separation or promotion.
Partial monitoring results in the most significant changes for workers hired
in the range θB < θ˜ < θb. In this case, hired workers are initially monitored.
But for workers who are not observed to face a challenge, monitoring declines
with seniority and eventually stops even before they are promoted. It is clear
that for θ close to θb, the probability of promotion must be lower than for
θ close to θB, but we have not been able to establish whether the relation
between the probability of promotion and θ is monotonic in this range and
expect that it need not be. Finally we note that if θb < θ˜ < θ
∗, the worker is
not monitored. In the absence of a failed challenge, θ is updated continuously
until it reaches θ∗ and the worker is promoted to the high job. As in the base
model, there are no promotions from the L-task to the H-task originating at
θ < θa or θb < θ < θ
∗.
3.3 Inconclusive challenges
Thus far we have assumed that failures and observed successes are fully in-
formative. Consequently our model predicts that all promotions end up at
either at the top of the upper level of the hierarchy (observed success) or at
its bottom (updating from the upper no-monitoring zone with no observed
failure). Further, when a failure is observed, the worker is known with cer-
tainty to be bad at this firm, which results in immediate separation. In
particular, there are no demotions. Relaxing this assumption seems natural.
12It appears to us that θ will reach θA only asymptotically, but we have not proved this.
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We briefly discuss two alternatives.
Consider what happens if monitoring can produce false positives, that
is the worker can appear to have resolved a challenge when none existed.
Then if a success is observed, the firm will not increase θ all the way to 1.
Specifically, let δ be the arrival rate of false positives and let µ = δ/ (δ + λ)
be the proportion of apparent challenges that are not really challenges. Then
if the firm observes that a worker with θ = θ0 has “responded to a challenge,”
the firm’s assessment of θ will be updated to
θ =
θ0
(1− µ)θ0 + µ. (10)
This would lead to different critical values (θa, θb, θ
∗) for the monitoring
zone and task-assignment. However, it is both intuitive and straightforward
to show that if, when δ is 0, there is an interval of θ for which the firm
monitors the worker, then for δ sufficiently small there is still an interval for
which the firm monitors the worker and if the worker appears to resolve a
challenge she is promoted to the H-task although the updated θ is less than
one.
Similarly, if there are false negatives, i.e., good workers fail challenges
with some probability γ < 1, the firm will revise θ downwards following a
failure, but it will not revise θ to 0. Separation follows only if the revised θ
falls below θ˜.
If the firm’s assessment of θ prior to the challenge was sufficiently greater
than θ˜, then even following failure the revised θ will exceed θ˜. This, in
turn, requires the worker to have spent sufficient time with the firm without
being monitored, or, if there are false positives, to have had some successes
observed. In particular we can show that, for a worker who has not been
previously monitored, a sufficient condition for a failure to cause a separation
is that the worker’s tenure at the firm satisfy
t < −λ−1 ln 1− γ
2− γ . (11)
Thus demotions will be positively related to the worker’s tenure at the
firm. Bad information about a low tenure worker leads to a separation, not
a demotion. This contrasts with Gibbons and Waldman who predict that
demotions, while rare, will be most likely among the recently promoted. We
know of no data on this issue.
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4 Implications for Nonmanagerial ILMs
The Internal Wage Profile: We return to the case where monitoring is a
binary choice. Extension to partial monitoring is relatively straightforward.
Recall that there are four ranges in the data. For θ < θa, the worker is
assigned to the L-task and is not monitored. For θa < θ < θb, the worker
is assigned to the L-task and monitored. For θb < θ < θ
∗, the worker is
assigned to the L-task and not monitored. For θ > θ∗, the worker is assigned
to the H-task and not monitored.
The wage profile for workers who remain with the firm therefore depends
on θ˜, the value of θ when the worker is hired. Note that we have not addressed
the firm’s decision about the level(s) of θ˜ at which to hire. Our model is mute
about whether firms will typically hire at one or a few values of θ˜ so that
only one or a few career paths are observed within a firm or whether there
will be substantial heterogeneity within individual firms. Thus the following
profiles may be found in different firms if they hire workers with different
values of θ˜ or within firms if they hire workers about whom they have widely
varying initial beliefs:
1. Workers with a low θ˜ are placed in the low no-monitoring range. If they
remain with the firm, the firm gradually increases its assessment of θ, and
therefore the wage, until θ = θa. At this point, the firm begins monitoring
the worker, and there is no updating of θ or the wage until a challenge
arrives, at which time the worker either leaves the firm or is promoted
to the high task. Recall that under the loss-mitigating model in the web
appendix, workers may be assigned to the H-task and monitored there
before promotion.
2. Workers with a somewhat higher initial θ are placed immediately in the
monitoring range. Although their wage will generally be higher than w(θa)
since most will have θ˜ > θa, in other respects they are similar to workers
who started at a lower θ˜ and rose to θ = θa.
3. Workers with a yet higher θb ≤ θ˜ < θ∗ remain in the L-task and receive
continuous wage increases until θ = θ∗, at which point they are promoted
to the H-task and receive wage increases that are asymptotic to the wage
associated with θ = 1.
4. Finally, any worker hired with a high θ˜ ≥ θ∗ is placed directly in the
H-task and receives continuous wage increases in a manner analogous to
those promoted from the upper no-monitoring range.
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The Hierarchical Structure: Up to now we have referred to tasks rather than
to jobs. Yet in many organizations, collections of tasks that appear quite
similar have different job titles (secretary I and II, tenured associate and full
professor). In the empirical literature, hierarchies are sometimes determined
by transition patterns across occupational titles as in Baker, Gibbs and Holm-
strom (1994a&b). In our model, it is natural to define three occupation titles:
LT1 (“low task 1”), consisting of workers in the low no-monitoring and mon-
itoring zones, i.e., θ ∈ [0, θb], LT2, consisting of the high no-monitoring zone
θ ∈ (θb, θ∗], and HT where θ > θ∗. Although LT2 is higher paid than LT1,
workers do not transition from LT1 to LT2, or conversely. Instead both feed
into HT . So LT1 and LT2 appear to share a location at the bottom of the
hierarchy below HT .
Next we compare our model’s predictions with some widely observed reg-
ularities in nonmanagerial internal labor markets (ILMs). The first three
regularities are drawn from a sample of nonunion establishments in the UK
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). The WERS asks man-
agers to list the determinants of pay in the largest nonmanagerial occupation
(e.g. skilled workers, administrative and secretarial, technical) in their es-
tablishment.
1. Many establishments have no variation in pay. Roughly 20 percent (em-
ployment weighted) of establishments report no variation in pay within
their largest class of nonmanagerial workers except for hours, overtime
and shift differentials. A further 11 percent differentiate pay based on
skills/core competencies and/or job grade but not factors such as senior-
ity or performance evaluations. We view the model as consistent with
but not predictive of this regularity. If the assessments θ˜ of workers at the
point of entry fall within a narrow band in the monitoring range (,between
θa and θb), then the wage would be approximately equal for all workers
in LT1. There is no strong reason to believe that this would happen
frequently. However, if the firm typically hires workers with a standard
set of qualifications at an entry level, and initial assessment is largely
determined by qualifications, then the range of θ˜ may well be narrow.
2. In firms that differentiate pay, individual wages are largely determined by
objective factors such as seniority, experience, occupational grade, educa-
tion and other formal qualifications which may be correlates of productiv-
ity but are not themselves measures of productivity. Among those firms
where there is clear differentiation in pay within similar jobs, 64 percent
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determine pay at least partly by age, experience, seniority and/or formal
qualifications such as education but not based on subjective performance
measures. In contrast, only 5 percent use subjective performance evalua-
tions but not these objective factors, and 31 percent use both. Fully 52
percent use neither objective nor subjective performance measures. In our
model, for workers who are in LT1 and LT2, the wage is fully explained
by θ˜ and seniority, though it is not strictly increasing with seniority at
all times. To the extent that the firm’s initial assessment θ˜ is largely de-
termined by education and experience, the model is consistent with this
regularity. However, some workers in the monitoring zone of LT1 are pe-
riodically promoted to the top of the hierarchy and therefore supersede
seniority.
3. Wages rise with seniority. In over half of the establishments that dif-
ferentiate pay within their largest class of nonmanagerial workers, wages
depend at least in part on seniority. In 62 percent, wages depend on
either age or seniority. In our model, except for workers who are being
monitored or at the top of the pay scale, wages increase with seniority at
the firm. In the base model, the worker’s wage may fall when monitoring
starts. We discuss this further at the end of the current section.
4. Many salary scales have a fixed number of steps. Workers at the top of the
scale receive no further individual pay increase unless they are promoted.
Dohmen (2004) describes one such salary scale for blue-collar workers. The
model is set in continuous time and therefore does not actually predict a
series of steps. However, it does predict that workers hired into LT1 will
hit the top of the scale when they begin to be monitored, and that the
wages of workers in HT who have been promoted from LT2 will increase
asymptotically to β (g + q).
5. Demotions are rare. This result is well established for managerial workers
(BGH). We are unaware of any single-firm study focusing on nonman-
agerial workers that establishes this result. However, demotions are suf-
ficiently rare among all workers (e.g. Kosteas, 2011) that we can safely
conclude that it also applies to nonmanagerial workers. In the base model,
demotions are nonexistent. Note, however, that the mechanism is quite
different from that in Gibbons and Waldman (1999a). There, worker
productivity increases continuously so that only a large adverse informa-
tion shock can cause demotions. In our model, large adverse information
shocks need not be rare but generate separations rather than demotions.
6. Wages jump at promotion. For samples of only or primarily nonmanage-
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rial workers, see Grund (2005), Kwon (2006) and Dohmen (2004). We note
that many learning models (e.g. Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a) have dif-
ficulty explaining this regularity although it is consistent with tournament
models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Waldman (1984) combines the two to
generate promotion effects. In our model wages jump at promotion for
those workers who are promoted from LT1 but not from LT2. DeVaro and
Waldman (2012) explore a model in which a promotion provides a stronger
signal of quality for workers with lower prior educational qualifications,
and are associated with larger wage increases. They also examine corre-
sponding evidence that is in keeping with this hypothesis. We note that,
in our model, a firm’s initial assessment of a worker’s quality θ˜ is likely
to be based at least in part on the worker’s prior qualifications. Workers
with lower qualifications are therefore likely to enter the firm in LT1, and
be promoted on a positive signal during monitoring. Such workers jump
to the top of the wage scale. Workers with higher initial qualifications,
although more likely to succeed than are those with lesser qualifications,
are inducted into LT2, and hence experience smooth wage increases as-
sociated with updating when they are promoted. Thus our model also
predicts the empirical pattern observed by DeVaro and Waldman.
In sum, our model captures many of the regularities observed in nonman-
agerial ILMs. In particular, it provides a theoretical basis for the observation
that individualized pay based on individual performance is far from univer-
sal, at least at the nonmanagerial level. Instead, much of pay is determined
by objective factors that may be correlates of productivity but are certainly
not measures of productivity.
The model also has some empirical weaknesses. The most important issue
is that, when monitoring is a binary choice, the model implies that the wage
falls when the worker is first monitored. This is a less obvious problem when
monitoring can be partial and thus begin slowly; nevertheless, it is somewhat
disturbing. Wage cuts at promotion are not unheard of, but they are not the
norm.
We make four observations in this regard. First, under the interpretation
of monitoring as testing, the worker and firm might share the cost of an ex-
ternal training program so that the nominal wage would not drop. Second,
while our model is set in continuous time, in reality, wage adjustments and
wage scales are discrete. If the requisite drop in pay when monitoring begins
is sufficiently modest relative to the growth in θ over the period leading up
to the monitoring, no wage decrease may be observed. Third, under the in-
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terpretation of monitoring as supervised assignment to the H-task, a decline
in the real wage may not be salient given the change in task. Finally, we
observe that it is well known that nominal wage cuts are rare (Bewley 1999),
and this phenomenon is poorly understood. It is therefore not surprising
that our model cannot explain their absence.
We also note that the model with only a binary monitoring decision coun-
terfactually predicts that promotions are concentrated at the top of the scale
of each of the lower level jobs in the hierarchy and thus come from only two
places in the wage distribution. Yet, the evidence strongly suggests that pro-
motions come from most parts of the wage distribution within a level of the
hierarchy. This difficulty is resolved by allowing for partial monitoring.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
With partial monitoring, our model permits the following stages as a function
of θ : No Monitoring, Partial Monitoring, Full Monitoring, Partial Monitor-
ing, No Monitoring, High Task. Not all stages need exist. For the no mon-
itoring range to exist, we require that b′(0) > 0, so that is that it is costly
to do even a little monitoring. For partial monitoring, we require b′′ > 0,
and for the existence of full monitoring, we require that b′(1) be sufficiently
small.
Therefore, the precise nature of the ILM depends on the monitoring tech-
nology and any factor that affects the quality of the workers who are hired.
Hence monitoring patterns and promotion paths are likely to vary widely
across companies and types of workers. If some workers are hired with low
θ, they will be monitored only after a delay. In the base model, such workers
are monitored in their current position when the firm becomes serious about
possibly promoting them. Alternatively, workers who may soon be promoted
are assigned to their new tasks but only under supervision.
Despite this variation and dependence on parameters, there are some
striking regularities in the literature on nonmanagerial ILMs that are con-
sistent with our model. If monitoring is very expensive, wages are likely to
be determined largely by observable proxies for productivity such as edu-
cation and seniority. If monitoring is inexpensive and challenges are very
informative, there is likely to be little wage growth within job assignment.
At intermediate monitoring costs, wages may rise formulaically within some
job assignment until some maximum wage. With partial monitoring, they
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climb formulaically except for “fast-trackers” who get a boost from resolving
a challenge.
Many firms monitor workers immediately after hiring, perhaps reducing
monitoring with tenure. According to the model, firms that fit this pattern
would be ones that typically hire workers in the upper partial monitoring
zone. Workers hired with θ˜ in this range are monitored initially, and the
intensity of monitoring declines with seniority at the firm and eventually
ceases some time prior to promotion. If the worker is observed to successfully
negotiate a challenge during monitoring, she is promoted. Of course a failed
challenge at any time leads to separation. This setting is consistent with
all of the regularities discussed in section 4 except the first (no variation in
pay) and sixth (wages jump at promotion). Also, in this setting promotions
do not come from various points in the wage distribution (end of section 4),
because workers are not hired into various points of the wage distribution.
Our model can be contrasted with Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006).
The major difference is that in our model, learning comes in large chunks
and when it does not come, either there is no learning or updating depends
only on the passage of time. In contrast, in Gibbons and Waldman, firms
continuously receive information about workers which allows them to distin-
guish among them. We do not view these approaches as strict alternatives.
Clearly, information can come in both forms. However, it is important to
note that there are testable differences in the models’ predictions. We have
already noted that the models make different predictions about the types of
workers who are demoted. In addition, our model suggests that large wage
increases at promotion should be associated with settings in which there is
a ceiling to the wage-scale. With continuous learning there is no such dis-
continuity and therefore no prediction of jumps. In principle, it should be
possible to look at different jobs in a hierarchy feeding into similar jobs at
a higher level in the hierarchy. When wages tend to stall at some value in
a job at the lower level, we should be more likely to see large increases at
promotion. In contrast, if wages rise continuously within the lower level job,
we should be less likely to see wages jump at promotion. We are not aware
of any studies directly related to these predictions.
Our approach has advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, in
many jobs wages are determined solely by objective measures such as tenure
and education that are only very imperfectly related to productivity. In our
model, wages are explained perfectly by θ˜, task assignment and seniority. If
education and experience are imperfect proxies for θ˜, the model is strongly
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consistent with this regularity. However, on the negative side, it is too strong.
There are many settings, particularly in managerial ILMs, in which wages are
determined partly by subjective performance evaluations even though much
of the variation in wages is explained by education, seniority and tier in the
hierarchy. Admittedly, it is a small step from assuming information comes
only in fully informative chunks to concluding that wages are independent
of performance. Still, we believe that the broader predictive power of the
model suggests that viewing information as “chunky” has value.
Our model is also consistent with both the steady increase in wages (at
least up to some maximum) that often accompanies seniority and the large
jumps in wages often associated with promotions. The strong association
between large wage increases and promotions does not arise naturally in
Gibbons/Waldman.
In both models demotions are rare, albeit for different reasons. In Gib-
bons and Waldman workers acquire human capital over time which usually
outweighs negative information. In our model negative information usually
causes a separation.
The Gibbons/Waldman model is better able to explain the frequency of
real wage decreases. In our model, in the absence of macroeconomic shocks,
real wage decreases are like demotions. Bad news is infrequent and generally
results in a separation, not retention with a lower estimate of θ. Small real
wage decreases happen only when there are negative macroeconomic shocks.
Allowing false negatives would also result in some real wage decreases.
Finally, we note that technology has made monitoring easier. In almost
any model including this one, this will make pay-for-performance more com-
mon. Consistent with this expectation, the proportion of British workers
receiving performance pay rose from 16 to 32 percent of workers between
1988 and 1994 (Manning and Saidi 2008). But our model suggests some less
obvious effects. Reducing the cost of monitoring could shift the nature of
the hierarchy. When monitoring is relatively expensive, we can have two
apparent jobs at the low task, one comprised of workers in or below the full
monitoring range and one comprised of workers above the full monitoring
range, with both jobs leading directly to the high task and relatively little
“lateral” movement. When monitoring becomes less expensive, particularly
if it becomes easier to observe less informative challenges, there will be more
movement from the lower range of the low task into the upper range of the
low task so that the low task now appears more like a single job in the hier-
archy. Thus the model may be useful to explain how hierarchical structures
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change over time.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Given Poisson arrival, the density function for the arrival of the first
challenge is λe−λt, and the probability that the first challenge arrives by time
τ is p(τ) = 1 − e−λτ . Thus the probability that a bad worker does not fail
by τ is 1− p(τ) = e−λτ .
Suppose a worker with prior θ0 has been put in a job at time 0 and
has not failed until time t. If the worker is good, then non-failure occurs
with probability 1, and if she is bad then the probability of non-failure is
equal to the probability that a challenge has not occurred by time t. Thus
the employer’s updated belief about the worker’s type (i.e., the updated
probability that the worker is good) is:
θ(t, θ0) =
θ0
θ0 + [1− p(t)](1− θ0) (12)
which for future reference we rearrange as
1− p(t) = θ0[1− θ(t)]
θ(t)[1− θ0] (13)
Let θ¯ be the threshold such that a worker who was initially placed in an
L-job is promoted to the H-job when θ(t, θ0) ≥ θ¯ . We will show below that
θ¯ is independent of θ0. Define t¯(θ0) such that θ(t¯(θ0), θ0) = θ¯. Below we will
suppress the arguments in t¯(.), θ(.) etc.
If θ0 < θ¯, then the employer puts the worker in the L-job, and promotes
her if she has not failed by time t¯. Thus a good worker produces q between
times 0 and t¯, and thereafter produces a flow output of g + q. A bad worker
fails before promotion with probability p(t¯). With probability [1− p(t¯)] she
produces q until t¯, and thereafter produces g + q until the first challenge
arrives, at which time she produces −ch and is fired. Hence the expected
payoff from the N-strategy with prior θ0 and threshold θ¯ is
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U(θ0, [1− p(t¯)]) = θ0
(
(g + q)
∫ ∞
t¯
e−rtdt+ q
∫ t¯
0
e−rtdt
)
+ (1− θ0)[1− p(t¯)]
[
e−rt¯
g + q
λ+ r
− ch
∫ ∞
t¯
λe−λ(t−t¯)e−rtdt
]
+ (1− θ0)
(
q
∫ t¯
0
e−(λ+r)tdt− cl
∫ t¯
0
λe−(λ+r)tdt
)
(14)
=
θ0q
r
+ e−rt¯{ θ0g
r
− 1
λ+ r
[1− p(t¯)](1− θ0) (λ(ch − cl) − g)}
+ (1− θ0)q − λcl
λ+ r
(15)
Note that e−rt¯ = e[−λt¯]
r
λ = [1− p(t¯)] rλ , which substituted in (15) yields
U(θ0, [1− p(t¯)]) = 1
r
[1− p(t¯)] rλ θ0g (16)
− 1
λ+ r
[1− p(t¯)]λ+rλ (1− θ0) (λ (ch − cl)− g)− (1− θ0)cl λ
λ+ r
+
θ0q
r
+
(1− θ0)q
λ+ r
The employer maximizes this payoff by choosing θ¯, or equivalently t¯ or
p(t¯). Maximizing U(θ0, [1− p(t¯)]) in (16) with respect to [1− p(t¯)] we obtain
the first order condition:
0 =
1
r
r
λ
[1− p(t¯)] rλ−1θ0g − 1
λ+ r
λ+ r
λ
[1− p(t¯)] rλ (1− θ0) (λ (ch − cl)− g)
[1− p(t¯)]−1θ0g = (1− θ0) (λ(ch − cl)− g) (17)
Let (17) be solved at t¯ = t∗, and correspondingly θ¯ = θ∗ etc. Using (13),
(17) simplifies to
g = (λ(ch − cl)− g) [1− θ
∗]
θ∗
θ∗ =
λ (ch − cl)− g
λ (ch − cl)
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It can be checked that the second derivative of U(θ0, [1− p(t¯)]) in (16) is
strictly negative at the solution, as follows:
∂2U
∂[1− p(t¯)]2 =
r − λ
λ2
[1− p]( rλ−2)θ0g − r
λ2
(1− θ0)[1− p]( rλ−1) (λ(ch − cl)− g)
= λ−2[1− p]( rλ−1) (−λθ0g + r ([1− p]−1θ0g − (1− θ0) (λ(ch − cl)− g)))
= − θ0g
λ[1− p]
< 0
so this is indeed a strict maximum.
Note also that the optimal threshold θ∗ is independent of the prior θ0, from
which it follows that a worker with prior θ0 ≥ θ∗ will be placed directly in the
H-job. At the optimum, the employer’s expected payoff from a new worker
with prior θ0 ≤ θ∗ can be obtained by making the appropriate substitutions
in (16) to give:
U∗(θ0) =
λ
r (λ+ r)
θ0g[
θ0
1− θ0
g
λ(ch − cl)− g ]
r
λ+(1−θ0)q − λcl
λ+ r
+
θ0q
r
for θ0 ≤ θ∗
(18)
It follows directly that U∗ is increasing in θ0. For θ0 ≥ θ∗. It is straightfor-
ward to check that the expected payoff is then
U∗(θ0) =
1
r
θ0 (g + q) +
(1− θ0) (g + q − λch)
λ+ r
> U∗(θ∗) for θ0 > θ∗

A.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2
When the first challenge arises, the firm gets
(
θ0
g+q
r
− (1− θ0) cl
)
. Expected
discounting is ∫ ∞
0
e−rtλe−λtdt =
λ
λ+ r
.
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Expected discounted monitoring costs are
b
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−λtdt =
b
λ+ r
U˜ (θ0) =
λ
λ+ r
(
θ0
g + q
r
− (1− θ0) cl
)
+
q − b
λ+ r
.
Rearranging terms yields (3)
A.3 Proof of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2
A.3.1 Preliminaries:
Given a prior θ, it is better to monitor the worker than never monitor if
U˜(θ) ≥ U∗(θ)⇒
1
r(λ+ r)
[λθg − rb] + (1− θ)q
λ+ r
+
θq
r
≥ 1
r(λ+ r)
λθg
[
θ
1− θ
g
λ(ch − cl)− g
] r
λ
+
(1− θ)q
λ+ r
+
θq
r
(19)
⇒ λθg
[
1− ( θ
1− θ )
r
λ (
g
λ(ch − cl)− g )
r
λ
]
≥ rb (20)
Name the left-had-side of (20) Z(θ):
Z(θ) = λθg
[
1− ( θ
1− θ )
r
λ (
g
λ(ch − cl)− g )
r
λ
]
(21)
A.3.2 Theorem 1.1
If θ = 0 or θ = θ∗, Z (θ) = 0, which proves the existence of the lower and
upper no-monitoring ranges.
A.3.3 Theorem 1.2
The value of no monitoring until time τ and then monitoring is
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θ0
(
q
∫ τ
0
e−rtdt
)
+ (1− θ0)
(
q
∫ τ
0
e−(λ+r)tdt− cl
∫ τ
0
λe−(λ+r)tdt
)
+
(
θ0e
−rτ
(
q
r
− b
λ+ r
+
λg
r (λ+ r)
)
+ (1− θ0) e−(r+λ)τ q − λcl − b
λ+ r
)
(22)
Maximizing with respect to τ :
0 = θ0qe
−rτ + (1− θ0) (q − λcl) e−(λ+r)τ−(
rθ0e
−rτ
(
q
r
− b
λ+ r
+
λg
r (λ+ r)
)
+ (r + λ) (1− θ0) e−(r+λ)τ q − λcl − b
λ+ r
)
(23)
or
e−λτ = θ0
λg − rb
b(r + λ)(1− θ0)
Recall that e−λτ = [1− p(τ)]. Hence by (13), we have
θ(τ, θ0) =
b (r + λ)
λ (g + b)
which is independent of θ0. Call this θa. For a worker with an initial θ below
this value, the firm will not monitor the worker until such time as θt reaches
this value. At this point monitoring is more profitable than never monitoring
if Z(θa) ≥ rb. Substituting for θa and rearranging terms yields condition 5.
Thus if (5) holds then U˜(θ)−U∗(θ) > 0 at θ = θa. We already know that
the reverse holds at θ = θ∗. It is straightforward to show that U˜(θ)− U∗(θ)
is strictly concave. Thus there is a unique θb ∈ (θa, θ∗ such that monitoring
is more profitable than not monitoring for θ ∈ [θa, θb], but less profitable for
higher θ.

A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.1
If a worker with θ = θt works for the firm, she gets expected present dis-
counted wages of Wt where the expectation reflects the probability of remain-
ing with the firm for different lengths of time and the expected cost of failure.
Upon failure, she receives the value of her outside option, which we denote
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Ua which makes her total value Wt+Ua (1− θt)λ/ (λ+ r) since she only goes
to the alternative job if she fails. The worker’s surplus from the relation is
therefore Wt +Ua (1− θt)λ/ (λ+ r)−Ua or Wt−Ua (r + λθt) / (λ+ r) while
the firm’s surplus is Vt−Wt where Vt (θt) is the expected present discounted
value of the worker’s output at the current firm.
So we have the Nash bargaining maximand
MaxWt (1− β) ln (Vt −Wt) + β ln
(
Wt − r + λθt
λ+ r
Ua
)
→ (1− β)
(
Wt − r + λθt
λ+ r
Ua
)
= β (Vt −Wt) (24)
Wt = βVt + (1− β) r + λθt
λ+ r
Ua. (25)
To see that (6) integrates to (25), note first that the flow value of out-
put, vt, by definition integrates to the expected present value of output, Vt.
If workers receive (1− β) rUa in each period they are employed then with
probability θt, the present value of what they receive is (1− β)Ua and with
probability (1− θt) it is (1− β) rUa/ (λ+ r) . But
θt (1− β)Ua + (1− θt) (1− β) rUa/ (λ+ r) = (1− β) r + λθt
λ+ r
Ua (26)
which proves that 6) is a solution to the bargaining problem. Since, by the
renegotiation-proofness requirement, this condition must hold for all t, it is
the unique solution.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Preliminaries: We state without proof that b = 0 for θ > θ∗.
Let τ be a small interval of time, p the probability that a challenge that
occurs during this interval is detected (given the intensity of monitoring),
and ∆ the change in the prior θ that occurs over τ given that the worker
neither fails a challenge nor observed to solve one. Bayesian updating leads
to the following backdating formula
θt −∆ = θt e
−λτ(1−p)
1− θt (1− e−λτ(1−p)) (27)
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τ =
ln θt(1−θt+∆)
(1−θt)(θt−∆)
λ (1− p) (28)
e−τ =
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− 1
λ(1−p)
(29)
Discretize the problem so that the firm must do the same level of monitoring
over some period ∆, and consider the case of a worker in the L-task. Then
U (θt −∆) = (q − b (p)) τ + e−rτ
((
(θt −∆) e−λpτ + (1− (θt −∆)) e−λτ
)
U (θt)
(30)
+ (θt −∆)
(
1− e−λpτ) g + q
r
)
(31)
− (1− (θt −∆))
(
1− e−λτ) cl
Substitute for τ using (28) and (29)
U (θt −∆) (32)
= (q − b (p))
ln θt(1−θt+∆)
(1−θt)(θt−∆)
λ (1− p) +
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− r
λ(1−p)
((
(θt −∆) θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− p
(1−p)
+ (1− (θt −∆)) θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− 1
(1−p)
)
U (θt)
+ (θt −∆)
(
1− θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− p
(1−p)
)
g + q
r
)
− (1− (θt −∆))
(
1− θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− 1
(1−p)
)
cl
Maximizing U (θt −∆) wrt to p gives
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0 =
dU (θt −∆)
dp
= − b
′
λ (1− p) ln
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆) + (q − b)
ln θt(1−θt+∆)
(1−θt)(θt−∆)
λ (1− p)2 (33)
− r + λ
λ (1− p)2
1− θt + ∆
1− θt
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− r+λ
λ(1−p)
ln
(
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
)
U (θt)
−
(
1−
(
θt
θt −∆− 1
(−1 + θt) (θt −∆)
)− λp
λ(1−p) λ+ r
r
)
r
(
θt (θt −∆− 1)
(−1 + θt) (θt −∆)
)− r
λ(1−p)
.(
ln θt
θt−∆−1
(−1+θt)(θt−∆)
)
λ (1− p)2
(θt −∆) (g + q)
r
− (1− (θt −∆))
(1− p)2
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− 1
(1−p)
ln
(
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
)
cl
which for τ > 0, p < 1 gives
0 =
dU (θt −∆)
dp
= − b
′
λ (1− p) +
(q − b)
λ (1− p)2 (34)
− r + λ
λ (1− p)2
1− θt + ∆
1− θt
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− r+λ
λ(1−p)
U (θt)
−
(
1−
(
θt
θt −∆− 1
(−1 + θt) (θt −∆)
)− λp
λ(1−p) λ+ r
r
)
r
(
θt
θt −∆− 1
(−1 + θt) (θt −∆)
)− r
λ(1−p)
.
(θt −∆)
λ (1− p)2
(g + q)
r
− (1− (θt −∆))
(1− p)2
θt (1− θt + ∆)
(1− θt) (θt −∆)
− 1
(1−p)
cl
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Now take the limit
lim
∆→0
dU (θt −∆)
dp
= −b
′r − b′rp− qr + br + U (θt) r2 + U (θt)λr − θtgλ− θtqλ+ clrλ− clrθtλ
λ (1− p)2 r
(35)
Then we have
(q − (1− θt)λcl) + λθt g + q
r
− U (θt) (λ+ r) = b+ b′ (1− p) ; 0 < p(θ0) < 1
(36)
(q − (1− θt)λcl) + λθt g + q
r
− U (θt) (λ+ r) ≤ b′ (0) ; p(θ0) = 0 (37)
(q − (1− θt)λcl) + λθt g + q
r
− U (θt) (λ+ r) ≥ b (1) ; p(θ0) = 1 (38)
The result we want is:
Theorem A.1. If b′(p) > 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1], then there is θa, θb with 0 < θa ≤
θb < θ
∗ such that
(i) p(θ) = 0 in the interval [0, θa)
(ii) p(θ) = 0 in the interval (θb, θ
∗].
(iii) If b′(0) is not too large, then p(θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ [θa, θb].
Proof of (i) and (ii): Suppose there is no monitoring at θt. Then U (θt) is
given by (18) if there is never monitoring, and is greater if monitoring is
efficient at a later point. Therefore the proof parallels theorem 1.1 with b′ (0)
substituting for b. If there is monitoring at θt then the left-hand-side of (36)
is less using U (θt) than (18) and thus will be less than b
′ (0) whenever it is
less than b′ (0) substituting (18) for U (θt) .
Proof of (iii): If there were no monitoring range, U (θt) would be given by (18)
and the left-hand-side of (36) would reduce to (21) which is strictly positive
for all θ ∈ (0, θ∗) and therefore greater than b′ (0) for b′ (0) sufficiently small.

Theorem (3.1) in the text is a restatement of parts (i) and (ii) above.
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